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1. Introduction.
The neologism biodiversity  was coined by Walter G. Rosen at some point
during the organization of the 21 —24 September 1986 National Forum on
BioDiversity  held in Washington, D. C., under the auspices of the US National
Academy of Sciences and the Smithsonian Institution.
2
 The new term was intended
as nothing more than a shorthand for biological diversity  for use in internal
paperwork during the organization of that forum. However, from its very birth it showed
considerable promise of transcending its humble origins. By the time the
proceedings of the forum were published (Wilson 1988), Rosen s neologism--though
temporarily mutated as BioDiversity --had eliminated all rivals to emerge as the title
of the book. The Washington forum was held only shortly after the founding of the US
Society for Conservation Biology in 1985 which, sociologically, marked the formation
of a new inter-disciplinary field dedicated to the conservation of biological diversity.
That conference was almost immediately followed by the publication of Michael E.
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 Historical material about “biodiversity” is from Takacs (1996).
2Soul s (1985) manifesto for the new discipline, What Is Conservation Biology?
which, by being published in BioScience, the journal with the widest general
biological readership in the US, ensured an immediate high visibility for the emerging
discipline. Within ecology, Daniel H. Janzen s (1986) exhortation to tropical ecologists
to undertake the political activism necessary for conservation fortuitously appeared in
1986. A sociologically synergistic interaction between the use of biodiversity  and the
growth of conservation biology as a discipline occurred and it led to the re-
configuration of environmental studies that we see today: biodiversity conservation
has emerged as the central focus of environmental concern.
The term biodiversity  immediately found wide use following its invention. As
Takacs has pointed out: In 1988, biodiversity did not appear as a keyword in
Biological Abstracts, and biological diversity appeared once. In 1993, biodiversity
appeared seventy-two times, and biological diversity nineteen times (1996, p. 39;
italics as in the original).  The first journal with biodiversity  in its title, Canadian
Biodiversity, appeared in 1991; a second, Tropical Biodiversity, appeared in 1992;
Biodiversity Letters and Global Biodiversity followed in 1993. Meanwhile conservation
biology as the science with the explicit goal of conserving biodiversity emerged as a
highly visible enterprise with considerable political appeal in Europe and neo-
Europe.3 Primack (1993) published the first textbook of conservation biology in 1993;
Meffe and Carroll (1994) followed with their comprehensive survey in 1994.
4
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 Essentially following Crosby (1986), “neo-Europe” is being used for places with a significant
influx of, and political domination by, European settlers: for instance, large areas of the Americas,
Australasia and southern Africa.
4
 An adequate history of the emergence of conservation biology is yet to be written; see,
however, Sarkar (1998b) for a sketch of that history.
3Nevertheless, the term biodiversity  has remained remarkably vague and its
measurement equally capricious. Is allelic diversity part of biodiversity? Or only
species? What about individual differences? Do we have to worry about community
structure? Is the number of species the appropriate measure? Do we have to take
rarity and commonality into account? Or should we worry about differences between
places? Both the problems of definition and measurement are widely acknowledged
among conservation biologists though precious little is done about them. The
purpose of this paper is an initial attempt to add enough precision to the concept of
biodiversity to make its ordinal, if not quantitative, assessment plausible. This is done
by returning the discussion of what biodiversity means from the abstract space in
which it usually occurs to the definite historically contingent context in which the term
emerged: biodiversity  must be analyzed in the context of conservation biology and
what it, as a goal-oriented enterprise that prescribes policies, must accomplish as it
tries to conserve biodiversity.
Put bluntly, the position that this paper will argue for is that biodiversity is to be
(implicitly)5 defined as what is being conserved by the practice of conservation
biology. Here, one distinction will be critical, and a medical analogy will help make
that distinction. The analogy between conservation biology and medicine is deep and
generally recognized.6 Both are goal-oriented enterprises and both embody norms
that are structurally so similar that it seems natural to speak of ecosystem health, the
maintenance of which is a central task of conservation biology. Both must operate
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4with whatever tools that are available, develop strategies to compensate for uncertain
data and, quite often, untested models. Finally, just as medicine must adjust to the
idiosyncracies of individual bodies, conservation biology must adjust to the
peculiarities of places. This makes medicine different from, say, physiology; and
conservation biology different from ecology. Those two latter disciplines try to obey the
imperative of generalization that conventionally marks good science (though not
necessarily always with success, especially in the case of ecology).7 Medicine and
conservation biology are constrained from following that imperative over everything
else: they must ensure that the peculiar individual entity that they are treating survives
even if procedures unique to it have to be crafted. The medical analog of biodiversity
is health,  equally difficult to define explicitly, but implicitly embedded in the practice of
good medicine.
In the medical context it is straightforward to make a distinction, though it may
well only be a matter of degree, between ameliorative and preventive medicine. The
former seeks to correct problems after they arise; the latter aims to prevent them
through adequate precautionary measures: vaccinations, proper diet, and so on. What
happens in an emergency room is an extreme case of ameliorative medicine. We
practice conservation biology s analog of ameliorative medicine when, for instance,
we allow a species to fall into decline and then make attempts at its recuperation. If
we intervene only when it has regressed to the brink of extinction--as, for instance, in
the United States, when we usually invoke the Endangered Species Act--, we are in
the emergency room. Bringing a critically endangered species back from the brink of
extinction is certainly part of maintaining biodiversity just as success in the emergency
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5room is part of maintaining health. But just as a definition of health would be skewed
if we were to rely solely on the measures we take in emergency rooms, or even (more
generally) on ameliorative medicine, concentrating on endangered species (or other
entities on the brink of extinction) will skew our definition of biodiversity.
Instead, we should focus on the preventive part of conservation biology.8 Since
the task of conservation biology is to conserve biodiversity, conservation should be
practiced even before population declines or other indicators of ecological trouble
have appeared. From this point of view, devising preventive procedures is the central
task of conservation biology. But how is this to be achieved? Over the last five years a
unified and comprehensive framework for this task has emerged though--to the best
of my knowledge--it has never been fully and explicitly presented before. The major
pieces have been developed in Australia and the United States though contributions
have also come from India, South Africa and the United Kingdom (and, quite possibly,
other places). The basic slogan, and this is as yet no more than a slogan, is the
adaptive management of landscapes.
The actual framework that has been developed is one for the prioritization of
places for biodiversity value9 and the formulation of management procedures for the
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 In a philosophically very important paper Caughley (1994) distinguishes between a “small
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6long-term (in principle, infinite) survival of the biological units of interest. The entire
process is supposed to be periodically iterated because species (or other units) may
have become extinct--or have recovered from problems--in the interim, thereby
changing the biodiversity value of a place, or because management practices may
have turned out to be ineffective. This is the only sense in which the process is
supposed to be adaptive. However, the framework is so new--it is yet to be fully
implemented anywhere--that we have no idea whether this requirement of being
adaptive will necessitate any change in the framework as it is currently understood. At
present adaptive management  is only a slogan embodying a tantalizing promissory
note. However, at least the basic prioritization-management framework can be
explicitly articulated. But, before I turn to that, a few points about place  need to be
noted.
Talk of place  takes us into intuitively trivial but, strangely, philosophically
relatively uncharted territory. A place is geographically rooted and loses its sense of
place exactly as it is generalized about: a place is a specific region on Earth’s surface
filled with the particular results of its individual history. To generalize about a place
involves abstraction from these particulars: the more we abstract, the more we lose
the peculiarities that made it that place. But places precise biogeographic
locations are what matter for conservation: they alone retain the heterogeneity that
provides the intuition for biodiversity. A preference for a place is not merely a
preference for an ecosystem or even a habitat,10 both of which are supposed to admit
abstract characterization: the same habitat at different places may hold a different
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 Both “ecosystem” and “habitat” are unusually vague terms; “ecosystem” used to be generally
understood in terms of an ecosystem ecology which used physical variables (most notably
energy flows) to describe spatially extended biological systems. In that context, “habitat” was
more rooted in place but habitats are also classified by type (wetland, tropical wet forest, and so
on). These days the two terms seem to be used interchangeably.
7complement of genes, species, communities, or whatever other unit that may be of
conservation interest. As noted before, worry about unique entities such as places
takes us along a direction opposite to that of conventional scientific generalization.
Philosophy--historically and, at least, the contemporary analytic tradition in Western
philosophy11--has largely followed science in the deification of generality.
Consequently places seem inappropriate loci of philosophical or scientific interest.
Nevertheless, in the context of biodiversity conservation, we have to worry about the
peculiarities of individual places, what entities they contain, what processes they
admit, and what constrains those processes, all of which being subject to the
contingencies of biological and geophysical history. As Leopold (1949, p. 196) put it in
his inimitable way: One cannot study the physiology of Montana in the Amazon.
Since, we have neither the economic nor the human resources to conserve every
place of any biological interest--we would end up wanting to conserve Earth itself!--
plans for conservation must ultimately involve a prioritization of places.
Returning, now to the prioritization-management framework, conserving
biodiversity requires a (preferably periodically iterated--recall the remarks about
adaptive  above--) four-stage process:
(i) we must select some feature by which biodiversity may be estimated; such a
feature is usually called a surrogate  and the problem of choosing and estimating it
is called the surrogacy problem.  Surrogacy is a relation between an estimator
parameter and a target parameter--this will be discussed below. Potential candidates
as surrogates for biodiversity include the number of species or other biotic entities
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8( richness ), complexity of trophic webs, and so on. From what was said above, it
should be obvious that the surrogacy problem is non-trivial, and much of this paper
(SectionSection 2 -3) will be spent arguing for a particular type of solution. Suffice it
here to note that whatever surrogates we finally choose must be ones that can be
practicably assessed in the field;
(ii) once we have selected acceptable surrogates, we can use them to order places
on the basis of their biodiversity content. This is the place prioritization problem.  How
we choose to solve it is critical to the definition of biodiversity.  The major point being
made in this paper (Section 4) is that each place prioritization algorithm implicitly
defines a (slightly) different concept of biodiversity; thus, we are left with a family of
(related) biodiversity concepts;
(iii) once we have a prioritized list of places on the basis of biodiversity content, we
can proceed to assess the projected long-term future of entities of interest in them, for
instance, populations of species.12 This is the viability problem.  A variety of methods
have been developed towards this end, for instance, stochastic population viability
analysis (PVA) for small populations13 as well as more conventional ecological
methods (Caughley and Gunn 1996). These methods provide estimates for a variety
of relevant parameters, for instance, in the case of populations, the expected time to
extinction and the probability of extinction within a specified time period, given the
intrinsic growth rate, carrying capacity, and other ecological parameters. The
biodiversity value of a place consists of its rank by both biodiversity content and an
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 Logically, we can attempt to solve the viability problem without place prioritization. However,
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9assessment of the viability of the entities of interest. Once we know the biodiversity
value of places, we can establish a new prioritization using it;
(iv) finally, we are at the stage when a discussion of appropriate policies for the
management of a place can begin. This is the feasibility problem.  Socio-economic
and political factors are typically more important in the formulation of such policies
than purely scientific  factors. People live in places and, by and large, have created
them, that is, made them that place. Ignoring people--or, worse, excluding them--is
why many conservation programs fail miserably, most notably Project Tiger in India.14
This paper is only about the first two stages of this process because, at the
point when those have been successfully completed, the problems of defining
biodiversity  and assessing biodiversity are solved. Section 2 will show how
complicated the former problem is. Section 3 is about the surrogacy problem; its
solution will show how biodiversity should be assessed. Similarly, Section 4 is about
the place prioritization problem; its solution provides a definition of biodiversity.
Finally, Section 5 draws some conclusions.
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 A detailed history of Project Tiger is yet to be written; see, however, Guha (1989) and Guha
and Martinez-Alier (1998).
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2. The Problem of Biodiversity.
What makes the definition of biodiversity  difficult is that the biological realm--
entities and processes--is marked by variability at every level of complexity. Restricting
attention to entities,
15
 two different hierarchical schemes are standardly used for
biological classification
16
: (i) a spatial (or generalized ecological) hierarchy starting
from biological molecules and macromolecules, through cell organelles, cells,
individuals, populations (demes) and meta-populations, communities, ecosystems
(communities and their physical habitats) ultimately to the biosphere; and (ii) a
taxonomic hierarchy from alleles through loci, linkage groups, genotypes,
subspecies, species, genera, families, orders, classes, phyla and kingdoms.
17
(Many intermediate levels are ignored in this description.)
There are two points to note about either hierarchy: (i) it is not clean in the
sense that biological entities fall into place in an exceptionless operationally well-
defined fashion; (ii) there is heterogeneity, responsible for biological diversity, at every
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level. The second point is almost trivial and a few examples will suffice to delineate its
scope: almost any two populations even of the same subspecies will differ in their
allelic profiles; except for some clonal organisms, almost any two individuals of the
same species will have different genotypes; there are virtually no two identical
ecological communities anywhere, and so on. The first point is equally important:
while some entities such as organelles and cells are reasonably well-defined,
examples such as fungi, symbionts and clonal organisms show that even individual
is not always precisely defined.18
Asexual species are notoriously hard to define and even sexual species,
usually defined by the ability to interbreed with fertile offspring, present problems.19
The most striking problem is the existence of ring species.  In Britain, the herring gull
(Larus argentatus) is easily distinguished--on morphological as well as reproductive
grounds--as a separate species from the lesser black-backed gull (Larus fuscus).20
However, as we go east beginning with the Scandinavian countries, and continuing
around the North Pole, we find different subspecies of the herring gull which can each
interbreed with the one (geographically) preceding it. Ten such subspecies are found
as we traverse Siberia, cross the Behring Straits, continue through Alaska and
Canada. The terminal subspecies in Britain is Larus fuscus which does not breed
with Larus argentatus. Thus, the usual definition of species turns out not to be
transitive!
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Conserving biodiversity, and construing the term intuitively to refer to all the
biological diversity that there is at every level of both hierarchies, amounts to saying
that biodiversity  refers to all biological entities. Biodiversity  in effect becomes all of
biology. Conservation would be an impractical proposal if biodiversity  is  construed
in this way. The standard move at this stage is to suggest that three entities capture
what is important about biodiversity: genes (alleles), species, and ecosystems. As a
simplifying proposal in the face of intractable complexity, this convention has merit. If
we conserve allelic heterogeneity completely, we take care of much of the diversity
below the genotypic and individual levels of our two hierarchies.
21
 If we conserve all
species, we do conserve all entities at higher levels of the taxonomic hierarchy though
we may not conserve interspecific hybrids which, because of the leakage in our
classificatory schema, may not qualify for conservation. If we conserve all ecosystems
we may conserve many communities and so on though this is hard to gauge: the
highly fashionable term ecosystem  is about the worst-defined in the ecological
literature.
Nevertheless, even this catholic proposal falls afoul of the diversity of biological
phenomena and does so in a rather spectacular manner. The monarch butterfly,
Danaus plexippus, has two migratory populations in North America. Beginning in late
August, the eastern population migrates to Mexico for five months. These butterflies
aggregate in millions in the high-altitude fir forests in the Sierra Transvolcanica, some
80 km west of Mexico City. There are nine other such over-wintering sites all within an
area of 800 km
2
 on isolated mountain ranges between 2 900 and 3 400 m.
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arguments against this position, see Sarkar (1998).
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Throughout the winter they remain sexually inactive. Survivors migrate north, starting
in late March, and lay eggs on milkweed (Asclepias sp.) along the Gulf Coast. These
8-month-old remigrants die but their offspring continue migrating north towards
Canada. Two or three more generations are produced over the summer. By the end of
summer, the last summer generation enters reproductive diapause and instinctively
begins a southerly migration towards Mexico. The western population shows similar
behavior, migrating to about 40 known overwintering sites in California. What is
striking about this behavior in both populations is that the migratory instinct is
hereditary and, yet, so specific.
In California some measures have been taken to protect overwintering sites
but the sheer cost of real estate may result in only a very few of the sites getting the
necessary protection. The future of the Mexican sites may be even more bleak.
Though, until recently, the high-altitude fir forests of Mexico had been relatively spared
from adverse anthropogenic effects, they now face at least six threats
22
: (i) large-
scale legal and illegal logging for timber and firewood; (ii) village expansion up the
mountains; (iii) increased use of fire to clear land; (iv) invasion of the forests by
lepidopteran pests; (v) spraying of Bacillus thuringiensis, an organic pesticide, the
effect of which on monarch butterflies is unknown; and (vi) increased tourism.
The disappearance of overwintering sites will not necessarily mean the
extinction of monarch butterflies: there are numerous non-migratory tropical
populations. However, what will disappear is the remarkable migratory behavior of the
two populations discussed above which has come to be seen as an example of
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endangered biological phenomena.
23
 Other examples include the seasonal
migrations of wildebeest in Africa and the synchronous flowering of bamboo in India.
While the former certainly are spectacular and in danger of disappearing because of
the construction of fences along migratory paths, the latter is perhaps even more
peculiar.
24
 One bamboo species, Thrysostachys oliveri, flowered in Burma in 1891
and seeds were sent to Calcutta and Dehra Dun, about 1 500 km apart. Clumps
raised at both these places flowered simultaneously in 1940. In 1961 there was
simultaneous flowering of Muli bamboo (Melocanna baccifera) in Assam and Dehra
Dun, about 1 500 km apart. In 1970 -71, there was simultaneous flowering of spiny
bamboo (Bambusa arundinacea) throughout India after a lapse of 45 years. Clearly, a
very precise biological clock exists in these species. In these cases, extinction of the
species would also lead to the extinction of the phenomenon of synchronous
flowering. More interesting, in this context, is that in extended habitats consisting of
forests of a single bamboo species, flowering occurs in waves, starting at one end
and ending up at the other. This is the phenomenon that would disappear if these
habitats do, even if the species persisted elsewhere (for instance, as isolated stands
in botanical gardens).
Protecting the holy trinity of genes, species and ecosystems will typically not
save such phenomena. The examples given above clearly show why conserving
species and, thus, the genes within them, will not be sufficient. If all the individual
places at which these phenomena occur are conserved, it follows trivially that the
phenomena will not disappear. However, sampling ecosystems and representing
them may lead to the protection of other exemplars of the type in question. In that
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case, even conserving representative ecosystems will not lead to the protection of
these phenomena. The question is whether we can devise a definition of biodiversity
that will lead to the protection of endangered and other biological phenomena of
interest, along with all other components of biodiversity. The proposals put forth in this
paper will not provide an adequate solution to this problem.
16
3. Surrogacy and the Assessment of Biodiversity.
It turns out that defining biodiversity  becomes easier once we have a handle
on what sorts of biological entities and related parameters we have a chance of
assessing in the field. At the very least, the discussion of the last section should have
made it clear that, because of the breadth and accompanying imprecision in the
meaning of biodiversity,  no single parameter, whether or not it can be realistically
estimated, is likely to capture all biological features that we may find of interest. We
will at least partly have to settle on conventions that will never be fully satisfying. If a
definition of biodiversity  is to have any practical application, two problems must be
solved: (i) a relatively theoretical one, what is to be measured?; and (ii) a practical
one, can we realistically obtain the data that we want?25 The former is the problem of
quantification; the latter is the problem of estimation. Jointly, these two problems
comprise the problem of assessing biodiversity. To solve both problems requires
choices of surrogates.
To solve the quantification problem, we will have to use surrogates that serve
as indicators of general biodiversity. Surrogacy is a relation between a surrogate or
indicator variable and a target variable: the surrogate variable represents the target
variable in the sense that it stands in for the target variable (that is, it replaces the
target variable completely in all our subsequent considerations). The term surrogate
has come to be used rather indiscriminately and I will introduce a distinction that will
bring some order to the often confusing discussion of finding and measuring
surrogates.
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This distinction is one between true surrogates  and estimator-surrogates.
True surrogates are supposed to represent general biodiversity, that is, the target
variable is supposed to be general biodiversity. The only constraint on a true
surrogate is that, in principle, it should be amenable to sufficient quantification to
allow its estimation in the field, even if only with difficulty. Thus, once we decide on a
true surrogate, we have solved the problem of quantification to the extent that we
require. The trouble, of course, is that because we do not know what general
biodiversity is, we will never be able to assert beyond controversy that we have found
the true surrogate. Worse, empirical considerations alone will not allow a complete
solution of this problem because of the indeterminacy of biodiversity : empirical
arguments can only settle questions about relations between empirically well-
specified entities. Conventions will enter into any determination of true surrogacy and
these conventions will have to be justified. The justification will be based on both
practical and apparently theoretical considerations.
The decisive practical consideration will be that there will have to be a tractable
estimator-surrogate for the true surrogate we choose: I will return to this issue shortly.
Turning to the theoretical considerations, we are faced with the doubly unfortunate
situation that there is a wide variety of candidates for true surrogacy and that
justifications for any of them are theoretical only insofar as they are guided by deeply-
held theoretical  intuitions. Consider four common and plausible candidates:
(i) character or trait diversity: the intuition behind this is that evolutionary mechanisms
usually impinge directly on traits of individuals in populations (Williams and
Humphreys 1996). The trouble is that trait  is not a technical term within biology and
trait diversity is, therefore, not precise enough to solve the quantification problem
adequately;
18
(ii) species diversity: as we shall see below, this can be made sufficiently precise.
Moreover, species diversity is the measure in most common use in almost all
practical discussions of biodiversity. However, this may well be because it is regarded
as an adequate estimator-surrogate (see below) rather than as a true surrogate.
Nevertheless, it is important to note that species are the most well-defined category
above the genotype in the taxonomic hierarchy and, because of that, the intuition that
species diversity is a good true surrogate has some theoretical merit. There are two
problems: (a) compiling a list of all species--including microbial ones--for any region
is expensive and time-consuming; and, moreover, (b) we know very well that there is
much more to biodiversity than species diversity;
(iii) life zone diversity: this reflects the intuitions that (a) what is important is the variety
of biotic communities with their associated patterns of interactions; and (b) that
focusing on communities will ipso facto take care of species since communities are
composed of species. The chief disadvantage is that, at least on the surface, the
quantification problem seems intractable: any classification of communities seems to
involve arbitrary conventions. Life zone classification provides a partial way out: it
involves coupling the characteristics of some communities in a place, in particular
vegetation, with environmental parameters such as elevation, precipitation and
temperature (and, sometimes, soil types). For many areas of the world, fairly precise
life zone classifications exist, for instance, the Holdridge (1967) classification for
central America and Ohsawa (1987) for the Bhutan Himalaya. Because of this, for
many regions, the quantification problem has a reasonably satisfactory solution so
long as we make sure that our choice of life zones is suitably fine-grained, that is, the
definitions are not so broad that many different localized patterns of biodiversity all fall
under the same life zone. Should our choice be too coarse grained, a choice of some
19
representation of a life zone will not ensure the full--or even an adequate--
representation of all the biodiversity within that life zone. Nevertheless, there remains
the nagging worry that even after paying due attention to this problem, life zone
diversity does not fully take into account species--or even community--diversity simply
because only a few communities are used to define life zones;
(iv) environmental parameter diversity: the most theoretically-justified intuition behind
this is that each point of the space spanned by environmental parameters is a
putative niche to be occupied by some species. Diversity of environmental parameters
is also defined well enough to solve the quantification problem adequately. Note that
since we would sample the environmental space uniformly, we do not fall afoul of the
problem that niches are not defined independently of organisms. However, not all
putative niches will be occupied, and the correlation between biodiversity in the
sense of diversity somehow associated with living organisms and environmental
parameters may not be very good. Again, since we cannot measure biodiversity
directly, we also cannot estimate quantitatively how good this correlation is. Finally,
when we select places, if we do so using environmental parameters on large enough
spatial scales, we also run into the danger of losing convergent but different species
and other biological units, for instance, marsupial analogs of placentals if we fail to
include Australian places because we selected similar environmental parameter sets
elsewhere.
There is no fully non-conventional solution to the true surrogacy problem. To
choose any of these four candidates or any other will require the use of pragmatic
criteria, in other words, the adoption of some convention. Two of our candidates have
obvious disadvantages: as noted before, character diversity is too imprecise. It cannot
be quantified even to the extent required to judge the adequacy of estimator-
20
surrogates for it; environmental parameter diversity, besides having the other
problems mentioned above, is also intuitively unappealing simply because it is
manifestly non-biological--at best it is a plausible candidate for estimator-surrogacy.
Our other two candidates--species and life zone diversity--remain plausible. Note that
nothing requires us to have only one true surrogate and it seems reasonable to use
both. Moreover, none of the candidates addresses the issue of endangered biological
phenomena. This can simply be added to the other two. This seems ad hoc, and
there seems to be no way out. It makes more sense to try to protect places that are
critical for the persistence of endangered biological phenomena while prioritizing
places (as described in Section 4).
In contrast to true surrogates, estimator-surrogates have a true surrogate as
the target variable. For estimator-surrogates, it is critical that they can be rapidly and
easily estimated. Since whichever true surrogate we choose will have to be
reasonably precisely demarcated, even if only by convention, the estimator surrogacy
relation is quantitatively precise. Moreover and this is a point that cannot be over-
emphasized it is an empirical relation that must be investigated through field
work.26 What has to be shown is that there is a good--preferably (but unachievably)
perfect--method to be predict true surrogate diversity using the estimator-surrogates.
Diversity (of true or estimator-surrogates) can be plausibly quantified in a
variety of ways. MacArthur (1965) showed how the Shannon-Weaver measure of
information (see Shannon [1948]) can be used to quantify species diversity. Roughly,
this measures the variability within a community and captures intuitions such as that
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 This point is correctly emphasized in an important paper by Landres, Verner and Thomas
(1988). In their terminology, estimator-surrogates are “indicators”; they also do not make the
distinction between the two kinds of surrogacy that is introduced here.
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a community X with 50 % species A and 50 % species B is more diverse than a
community Y with 90 % A and 10 % B. It is trivial to extend this definition to life zones
(though not to endangered biological or other phenomena). If this is the measure we
adopt, then it must be shown that our estimator-surrogates allow us to predict it
correctly. The strategy suggested here is different. Recall the discussion in Section 1
of how places are supposed to be prioritized on the basis of biodiversity content.
Suppose that this is done for a small subset of spaces using the true surrogates.27
Now, repeat the prioritization using the estimator-surrogates. If the estimator-
surrogates are adequate, the results should be the same, and we can proceed to use
estimator-surrogates in the future.28
Traditionally, the estimator-surrogate that has been the most popular is
species richness, the number of species at a place, which is distinct from species
diversity. (Returning to the example from the last paragraph, communities X and Y
have the same species richness [namely, 2] though X is more diverse than Y.)
Gaston (1996) lists five lines of evidence that point to species richness as a good
estimator-surrogate for biodiversity: (i) species richness can be correlated to many
measures of ecological diversity and it functions better in this way than most
estimator-surrogates including species diversity (see, also, Magurran [1988]); (ii)
species richness is sometimes positively correlated with the number of higher taxa
such as genera; (iii) when species richness is relatively high, it is correlated with trait
richness; (iv) though this remains controversial, some parameters that are supposed
to measure the complexity of community webs (including the number of edges and
                                                
27
 It can practicably only be done for a small subset of places simply because the assessment
of true surrogates is typically difficult.
28
 Section 4 will show how this procedure implicitly uses the concept(s) of biodiversity as
defined there.
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the length of directed paths along trophic levels) seem to be correlated with species
richness; (v) relatively high species richness is also correlated with increasing
topographic diversity. Of these five points, the second and third are irrelevant since
they refer to richness at the level of higher taxa or traits rather than diversity; the third
assumes that complexity of trophic webs is related to diversity which is unproven in
the field; and the first and fifth are relevant only if we accept environmental diversity as
a true surrogate, an option that was argued against above.
There are, moreover, two strong arguments against using species richness or,
for that matter, richness of any estimator-surrogates to prioritize places: (i) it is well-
established that prioritizing places by richness is usually not--according to current
(empirical) data an effective way of targeting diversity. The top two (or more) places
may be rich in the targeted surrogates but may have very similar surrogates.
Conserving both may add nothing or very little to what would be obtained by
conserving one and some other place. Conserving both would thus be an ineffective
allocation of limited resources; and (ii) the reason why selecting places on  the basis
of richness is ineffective is that, even intuitively, richness is not the same as diversity.
Diversity, including biodiversity, connotes difference  and unlikeness the amount
of variety.29 Finally, Gaston s analysis ignored spatial scales and it is implausible that
his five claims hold at all scales.
There are at least seven more plausible candidates for estimator-surrogates:
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 Using richness is often connected with the identification and use of “hot-spots,” that is, places
with very high richness to prioritize places. Therefore, rejecting richness means rejecting such hot-
spot analysis. Note, however, that this is not the only use of “hot-spot.” Myers (1988, 1990) and
others have taken account of endemism, besides richness, in their definition of “hot-spot.” These
analyses come closer to the one in the text than those which are only based on richness.
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(i) environmental parameter composition30, that is, a list of parameters such as
average temperature and rainfall, which are often easy to obtain. They are widely
recorded or can be inferred from reliable models;
(ii) soil type composition which will be based on a classification of soil types using
their composition and other physical properties. Once again such data are easily
obtainable, and can sometimes be inferred from satellite images;
(iii) dominant vegetation composition which can also be inferred from satellite
images:
Usually these three are used simultaneously. They have the obvious advantage of
being relatively easily assessed. Thus the estimation problem has a good solution.
However, the empirical question of the relation of these data to species diversity (let
alone other potential true surrogates) remains unresolved. This question is being
systematically investigated in New South Wales and Texas (and, very possibly, other
places); Returning to the candidates for estimator-surrogacy, the other four are:
(iv) species composition, a list of the species occurring at a place. In practice we
never have a complete list. Microscopic species are almost impossible to survey
adequately and, usually, not even all larger species are surveyed;
(v) life zone composition, a list of the habitats occurring at a place (for instance,
tropical wet forest, moist forest, etc.) based on a pre-determined classification. As
noted above, classifications of this sort now exist for many areas of the world;
(vi) genus or other higher taxon composition, which is what we often have instead of
composition at the species level;
                                                
30
 These “compositions” should be viewed as a list of entries for each place. The importance of
maintaining--and not compounding--such lists will be explained in Section 4.
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(vii) subsets of species composition, once again, what we may have to use because
complete species compositions are almost never available in practice. For some taxa
such as birds and butterflies, extensive information exists.
All four of these are the ones most commonly used in practice; but there has been
very little empirical work establishing the adequacy of the last two as predictors of any
true surrogate diversity. If species diversity is taken to be the (only) true surrogate, the
adequacy of the first of these four (species composition) is obviously trivially
guaranteed; for any of the other true surrogates the problem of determining its
empirical surrogacy remains. An analogous point can be made about life zone
diversity as the only true surrogate and life zone composition as an estimator-
surrogate for it. Moreover, trying to use total species composition as an estimator-
surrogate is unjustified for the simple reason that it cannot be assessed rapidly and
easily, as is required for such surrogates. There is no reason to believe that the same
estimator-surrogates will be the best one for all regions. But that is not necessary so
long as the ones that are used are shown to be adequate for the context of their use.  
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4. Place Prioritization and the Definition of Biodiversity.
Once true surrogates have been chosen (partly by convention), and the
adequacy of a set of estimator-surrogates has been established empirically, the
estimator-surrogates must be estimated in the field. In the interest of brevity, from this
point on in this paper, unless explicitly indicated otherwise, surrogate  will be used
only to refer to estimator-surrogates. At this stage what we have in hand are a set of
places and list of surrogates at each place. We now have to prioritize these places
and the prioritization procedure will implicitly define what biodiversity  is taken to be.
But, to prioritize places in this fashion and this is a critical point we need no
absolute concept or measure of biodiversity. We merely need to be able to decide
whether place A has greater biodiversity than place B.
If we accept this limited requirement to capture the intuition of biodiversity that
is relevant for our purposes, it becomes fairly straightforward to give an operationally
precise definition of biodiversity as a relative concept. Biodiversity will be relativized in
two ways: (i) the definition will only try to say if place A has higher (or the same or
lower) biodiversity than B; and (ii) it will do so only against a background set of places
Π. What our procedure (or algorithm) must do is this: given Π and a set of new places,
Σ, and the algorithm must prioritize these places on the basis of biodiversity using the
surrogate lists for Π and for each place in Σ. This will be done by considering two
places at each stage and iterating the process over the entire set of places, Σ,
resulting, finally, in a prioritized list.
Consider any pair of places A and B. At the first step of the algorithm A has
higher (same/ lower) priority than B relative to Π if and only if its surrogate list has
more (less/ the same number of) entries not in the list of Π than the surrogate list of
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B.31 This rule of prioritizing places by considering the number of new surrogates is
called complementarity  in the literature.32 Note that at this stage there may be a tie
between A and B. The way we choose to break such ties generates (slightly) different
algorithms. We may break it using a random process (for instance, appealing to a
random number generator or, what amounts to the same thing, using lexical order,
that is, selecting whichever of A or B that is first on our list of places). This is a pure
complementarity  algorithm. Or, before invoking randomness, we may use rarity: we
would give higher priority to the place which has more rare surrogates (either among
those not already represented in Π or in the entire data set). This choice generates
complementarity-rarity  algorithms. (In some versions of this algorithm, rarity is used
before complementarity, resulting in "rarity-complementarity" algorithms.33) If we still
have a tie after invoking rarity, we may introduce various other rules: adjacency (is a
new place adjacent to one already in Π? If so, choose it because it will lead to larger
connected reserves); area (choose smaller/larger places); cost (choose the place
with the lower cost); even richness; and so on. Each combination and subsequent
permutation generates a different algorithm.
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 In practice, the algorithms that are used are slightly more complex. Instead of only inquiring
which surrogates do not occur in Π, they inquire which surrogates are not yet adequately
represented in Π. However, the level of representation that is considered to be adequate is
ultimately set by convention though it presumably will be guided by a fair amount of information
about probabilities of extinction of different entities.
32
 This principle was independently discovered at least four times: Kirkpatrick (1983), Ackery and
Vane-Wright (1984), Margules, Nicholls and Pressey (1988) and Rebelo and Siegfried (1990).
The clearest early statement is due to Margules, Nicholls and Pressey (1988); the term
“complementarity” was introduced by Vane-Wright, Humphries and Williams (1991).
33
 Rarity-complementarity algorithms are often supposed to be address the problem of ensuring
the protection of endemic species (or other surrogates) better than complementarity-rarity
algorithms (Aggarwal et al. 2000). While this is intuitively plausible, it has not been empirically
demonstrated.
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Once a tie is broken, we update Π by adding the selected place to it, and iterate
the process. We stop the process once every surrogate is represented34 and the
priority list consists of those places added to Π in the order in which they were added.
At the end, we should add places that are necessary for the persistence of
endangered biological phenomena. Once again this seems ad hoc but no better
solution seems to be forthcoming.
This iterative procedure shows how additions may be generated to a system of
reserves. However, to set the iteration going, we need to specify a base-line: how Π is
to be constructed from the null set. In practice we will rarely face this problem: existing
networks of protected areas will provide the reference set though, usually, because
these places have traditionally been selected using criteria other than biodiversity
(sublime landscapes, wildernesses, etc.), such reference sets will not be
repositories of high biodiversity. Nevertheless, for the sake of definitional
completeness, we must be able to solve the problem of definition the reference set
ab initio. Consistent with the intuition that has guided our algorithms, we do so by
invoking rarity. The first place(s) to be included in Π are those that have the rarest
surrogates. If there are places with surrogates that occur nowhere else, then these
enter  Π at the beginning. If not, we choose the place(s) with the most rarest
surrogates that are present in our data.35
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 Usually (see Footnote 31) we wait until every surrogate is represented to the level of
adequacy we initially chose.
35
 An alternative way of initializing the process is to use richness (Kirkpatrick 1983). This is the
only situation in which richness is sometimes more efficient than rarity in the sense that a smaller
set of places may eventually suffice to ensure adequate representation of surrogates. However,
the differences are not great.
28
Different concepts of biodiversity are implicitly defined by these algorithms:
biodiversity is the relation used to prioritize places. The crucial rule is
complementarity: by focusing on new surrogates it naturally captures our intuition of
biodiversity. With some rhetorical flourish we may just as well say that what matters is
complementarity: the concept of biodiversity is parasitic on the concept of
complementarity. That complementarity and rarity should have some role in our
concept of biodiversity should not be controversial. Recall that our context is one of
biological conservation. We want to protect what is threatened by extinction: by and
large, rarity captures that intuition.36 We want to protect as many different entities that
are not already adequately protected: complementarity exactly captures that intuition.
It is far less clear that we are still defining biodiversity  when we invoke the
other rules such as adjacency, area, or cost in our algorithms. I leave it as an open
question whether we should restrict biodiversity  to what is defined by algorithms that
only invoke rarity and complementarity or whether we should be more catholic in our
taste. I will adopt the latter approach in Section 5 though only for expository
convenience.
Finally, it is important to note two points about these algorithms: (i) they operate
on lists of surrogates for each space. We cannot compound these lists into single
numbers--such as richness or MacArthur s diversity index--and continue to use these
algorithms. Field work generally involves compiling such lists. Yet, it is common
practice among field biologists to reduce these lists to single numbers (or small sets
of numbers) and discard the primary data. The proposals being made in this paper
                                                
36
 However it does not capture it completely: some species, for instance, may naturally be rare
without being in danger of extinction.
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about the definition and assessment of biodiversity argue strongly against this
practice; and (ii) these algorithms show very strong history-dependence. Which
places we start with and the order in which the rules are applied make a very
significant difference on the priority ordering of the set of places we work with.
Consequently, if we introduce a cut-off above which we conserve places and below
which we do not, the set of places targeted for conservation is similarly history-
dependent. While this initially appears to be a problem--or at least an undesirable
feature--of our procedure, in some contexts we can convert it into a virtue. For
instance, suppose that we have sociopolitical constraints that we must also try to
satisfy while recommending a set of places for conservation (that is, a reserve
network of some sort or other). We can initialize our procedure by choosing the first
place differently and generate different sets of potentially conserved places which
equally satisfy our biodiversity criteria. Then we can opt for the one that best satisfies
our  sociopolitical criteria.
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4. Conclusions.
We have succeeded in showing--possibly very unsatisfactorily for purists--how
biodiversity may be defined and assessed. The solution of the assessment problem
involved, in part, recourse to convention. This will probably be unpalatable--or, at least,
undesirable--to some. I share this disquiet and await their less conventional
alternative proposals. More importantly, the solution points to empirical work that must
be done not solely for philosophical reasons, but for the practical goal of successfully
conserving biodiversity. The empirical work that is critical in this manner is the
identification of adequate estimator-surrogates. To the extent that philosophical
analysis has had this practical scientific consequence--and one that has unfortunately
not received adequate attention within science--it underscores the importance of
philosophy for science.
Turning to the proposed solution of the problem of defining biodiversity,  the
following five points should be noted:
(i) the most interesting facet of this solution to the definition and assessment
problems for biodiversity that it was only possible because of contextualization. We
determined what biodiversity  is by exploring what it was supposed to accomplish,
and supposed to do so in the very specific and historically contingent context of the
deterioration of our biological legacy during the past half-century. The rationale for this
move was that this was the context in which the term biodiversity  was introduced and
gained currency. With contextualization, the solution appears easy, even trivial.
Perhaps an important moral to be drawn from this story is that contextualization may
be of general therapeutic value for the analysis of recalcitrant concepts;
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(ii) because a variety of prioritization algorithms have been proposed, what we have
defined are a set of different concepts of biodiversity. However, there is one very good
reason to suppose that these different definitions form a family (of closely related
concepts): they all share the invocation of the complementarity and rarity rules.
Moreover, if we restrict our definitions to algorithms that invoke only those rules, the
differences between the definitions are relatively trivial. Some may prefer--or even
demand--a single definition but it is hard to see any theoretical or practical rationale
behind such a move;
(iii) the offered definitions are implicit rather than explicit since they are defined
through the algorithms that are used, rather than by explicit necessary and sufficient
conditions. It is incumbent upon those who prefer explicit definitions as a matter of
principle to come up with a reasonable proposal for biodiversity.  The difficulties
discussed in Section 2 suggest--at the very least--that this will not be easy. Moreover,
implicit definitions are de rigeur in science and mathematics and it does not seem
reasonable to want to rule them illegitimate in conservation biology;
(iv) recalling the analogy between conservation biology and medicine that was drawn
in Section 1, the solutions proffered here underscore the importance of a preventive
rather than ameliorative approach in conservation biology. While the emphasis on
rarity captures, in part, our concern for endangered species and other biological
entities, complementarity takes us to all surrogates, no matter what their
endangerment status is;
(v) the major flaw of the present analysis is that the treatment of the problem of
endangered biological phenomena remains ad hoc. Places required for their
32
protection were added to the list of prioritized places (in Section 4) by fiat. Further work
needs to be done to see if this lacuna can be removed.
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